SAT-based Reverse Engineering of Gate-Level Schematics using Fault
  Injection and Probing by Keshavarz, Shahrzad et al.
SAT-based Reverse Engineering of Gate-Level
Schematics using Fault Injection and Probing
Shahrzad Keshavarz∗, Falk Schellenberg†, Bastian Richter†, Christof Paar†,∗ and Daniel Holcomb∗
∗University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
{skeshavarz, dholcomb}@umass.edu
†Horst Go¨rtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universita¨t Bochum, Bochum, Germany
{firstname.lastname}@rub.de
Abstract—Gate camouflaging is a known security enhancement
technique that tries to thwart reverse engineering by hiding the
functions of gates or the connections between them. A number
of works on SAT-based attacks have shown that it is often
possible to reverse engineer a circuit function by combining a
camouflaged circuit model and the ability to have oracle access to
the obfuscated combinational circuit. Especially in small circuits
it is easy to reverse engineer the circuit function in this way, but
SAT-based reverse engineering techniques provide no guarantees
of recovering a circuit that is gate-by-gate equivalent to the
original design. In this work we show that an attacker who
doesn’t know gate functions or connections of an aggressively
camouflaged circuit cannot learn the correct gate-level schematic
even if able to control inputs and probe all combinational nodes
of the circuit. We then present a stronger attack that extends
SAT-based reverse engineering with fault analysis to allow an
attacker to recover the correct gate-level schematic. We analyze
our reverse engineering approach on an S-Box circuit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gate camouflaging is a technique that has attracted the
attention of chip designers in recent years. Camouflaging seeks
to hide the true structures of the chip so that imaging-based
reverse engineering cannot easily recover the details of the
implemented design. The purposes of camouflaging include
IP protection and preventing targeted attacks. The related
work section of this document describes some of the different
camouflaging mechanisms that exist in academia and industry.
A number of attacks exist against camouflaging including
the SAT attack which is based on Boolean satisfiability solving.
In this attack, a reverse engineer uses an uncertain model of
the design, together with a functional instance of the chip
as an oracle, to discover a set of tests that will reveal the
exact logic function of the design. The SAT attack extracts
the correct function of the design, but is unable to make any
claim regarding whether it has recovered a design that matches
the gate-level functions of the obfuscated one, or another gate-
level schematic that is overall functionally equivalent to the
obfuscated design. In this work, we present a stronger SAT
attack for small circuits that makes the following contributions:
• We show how an attacker with probing and fault injection
capability can use SAT-based reverse engineering to guide
his decisions about which faults to apply and which nodes
to probe.
• We propose a new SAT-based reverse engineering for-
mulation that can solve for unknown connections while
restricting the search to acyclic networks and avoiding
combinational loops that can thwart SAT attacks.
• We show that fault injection and probing provide addi-
tional discriminating factors in reverse engineering that can
help SAT attacks to recover schematics that are equivalent
to the target on a gate-by-gate basis, instead of merely
functionally equivalent in traditional SAT attacks.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Imaging-based invasive reverse engineering works by de-
capsulating the chip, imaging and removing each layer in
succession, and then using the images to reconstruct the circuit
schematic.
A countermeasure against imaging-based reverse engineering
is the use of various camouflaged gates or camouflaged
interconnects. Camouflaged components are ones in which
different functions are implemented by features that are
indistinguishable to the reverse engineer, so that function cannot
be inferred from appearance. Camouflaged gate libraries use
hard-to-observe structural techniques to differentiate the gate
functions [21], [6], use functionality that can be controlled
without structural differences via transistor doping [1], [19],
[13], [8], [7], use conducting and non-conducting interconnects,
or use secret key inputs that control the design functionality
with a structure [10] that cannot be distinguished by the attacker
once the chip is delayered [5]. Though camouflaging is a
promising hardware security enhancement technique, it comes
with additional overheads in the chip area, power consumption,
and fabrication cost, and there is always a trade-off between
the security and overheads [4], [15].
A. SAT Attacks
SAT attacks are based on principle of finding discriminating
input vectors, which are input vectors that can eliminate at least
one additional circuit function hypothesis once the correspond-
ing output vector is known. Once no further discriminating
vectors can be found, it means that no further circuit functions
can be ruled out by any tests, and therefore the current set of
discriminating inputs is sufficient to uniquely identify the circuit
function. Techniques from oracle-guided synthesis [9] are used
in SAT-based attacks to reverse engineer gate camouflaging or
logic encryption [14], [20].
It is important to note that a circuit reverse engineered by
oracle-guided synthesis is only guaranteed to be functionally
equivalent to the obfuscated circuit, and there is no assurance
that it will match the obfuscated circuit on a gate-by-gate basis.
Ensuring gate-by-gate equivalence to the obfuscated circuit is
generally impossible because the attack only has information
about the inputs and outputs. Designs recovered through oracle-
guided synthesis may therefore be unsuitable for certain classes
of side-channel or fault injection attacks that require knowing
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the states of all combinational circuit nets. In this paper, we
propose a SAT-based de-obfuscation technique that assumes
very little knowledge about the obfuscated circuit connections
or gates, yet still attempts to reconstruct the exact gate-level
schematic of the obfuscated circuit.
B. Attacker Model
The attacker model we consider in this work represents
an adversary that is trying to reverse engineer a circuit
from the backside. This scenario may arise in chips with
anti-tamper mechanisms that prevent delayering to learn the
interconnections of each metal layer. From the backside, the
adversary has a very limited knowledge of the circuit as listed
below:
Connections: All connections in the circuit are unknown.
This means that any gate input in the circuit could be connected
to the output of any other gate in the circuit.
Gate inputs/outputs: Each gate has a single output, and
the output pin of the gate can be identified, yet the adversary
cannot see what the gate output connects to. The adversary
can know how many inputs each gate has, but cannot know
which signals (primary inputs or outputs of other gates) are
driving them. If the number of inputs to each gate cannot be
determined, the attacker can be conservative and overestimate
the number of inputs to each gate.
Gate functions: Our model considers that the attack may
know nothing about the gate functions. That is, a gate with n
inputs can implement any of 22
n
possible functions.
The assumed attacker capabilities in this work are as
described below:
Circuit inputs/outputs: Attacker has a working circuit
instance, and can apply the desired inputs to the circuit and
observe the outputs. The circuit instance used to correctly map
input vectors to output vectors is called the ”oracle”. In case
the circuit is part of an encryption hardware, the attacker can
control the input to the encryption hardware and knows (or is
able to set) an internal secret key. This enables calculating any
intermediate values that might occur during computation (the
primary outputs of our target circuit).
Probes: At some points in the work, the attacker is allowed
to probe the value of arbitrary gate outputs. In this setting,
the attacker still has no knowledge of connectivity and hence
doesn’t know what else is being driven by the node that is
probed. Due the nature of probing, it is not possible to probe
the value of gate inputs.
Fault Injection: At some points in the work, the attacker
is allowed to inject faults using a laser.
III. SAT FORMULATION FOR UNKNOWN GATES AND
CONNECTIONS
We demonstrate the modeling of connections and gate
functions using the example shown in Fig. 1. In this example,
an unknown 2-input gate has output node C and thus is denoted
as gate C. The gate exists within a circuit having 5 nodes (A,
B, C, D and E). The uncertainty about logic function of gates
and uncertainty about wiring connections are both translated
into Boolean configuration variables (shown as white dotted-
line boxes) that are connected to multiplexers. The values of
configuration variables are unknown, and the SAT solver’s task
is to find them.
Since nothing about the connection of gates are known to
the attacker, multiplexers are added that are responsible to
select which node in the circuit is connected to each input
of the gate. For example, in Fig. 1, since the gate has output
C, the connection multiplexers choose from the other four
nodes of the circuit (A, B, D and E) to determine which is
connected to each of the gate’s inputs. In a circuit with N nodes,
the connection multiplexers are therefore (N − 1)-to-1 input
multiplexers, as they can select any other node in the circuit
except for that gate’s own output (node C). In some cases, as
will be shown later, certain connections can be ruled out and
the number of multiplexer inputs would reduce accordingly.
To keep track of the connectivity between gates, as will be
needed later to ensure that the solver only considers acyclic
networks, we define transition relation predicates for all pairs
of gates. If there is a connection from output of gate A (node
A) to one of the inputs of gate C (that has output node C), the
predicate R(A,C) will be 1 and otherwise it will be 0. In Fig.
1, predicate R(A,C) is true if and only if the configuration
variables for the connection multiplexer connect the output
of gate A to an input of gate C; therefore, R(A,C) is true
whenever sel1sel0 = 00 or sel3sel2 = 00.
The second type of multiplexer employed is for choosing
the function of the gate based on the selected inputs from
the connection multiplexers. The function multiplexer can be
regarded as implementing the truth table of the gate function,
choosing which combination of input values should result in
which binary value on the gate’s output. For a gate of n inputs,
the function multiplexer would be a 2n to 1 multiplexer. Note
that our model puts no restrictions on the function of the gates.
However, if the attacker has knowledge of the gate library
used, he can put restrictions on the configuration variables that
determine the gate’s function. For example, in figure 1, if the
attacker knows that the 2-input gate could only be NAND
or NOR, then he can restrict the multiplexer’s input values
to ”1110” (for NAND gate) and ”1000” (for NOR gate)
by adding clauses to the SAT problem to disallow all other
combinations.
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Fig. 1: An example of the proposed gate model. Depending
on the values of the configuration variables, this model allows
each gate input to be driven from any node, and allows the
gate to implement any possible logic function over its inputs.
IV. LEARNING FROM VOLTAGE PROBING
Adding more constraints and known facts to the SAT problem
can make it easier to solve. One approach that can help the
input circuit nodes
vector A B C X
0000 1 1 0 0
0001 0 1 0 1
0010 1 1 1 0
0011 0 0 1 0
0100 0 1 0 1
(a) Probed node values.
AB X AC X BC X
00 0 00 1,1 00
01 1,1 01 0 01 0
10 10 0 10 0,1,1
11 0,0 11 0 11 0
(b) Gate truth table for different connections.
TABLE I: Example showing that probed values can rule out
certain connections. One of the three possible node pairings is
non-deterministic and will be rulled out by SAT solver.
attacker with reverse engineering is a semi-invasive technique
called laser voltage probing (LVP) [12], [23]. In laser voltage
probing, the target transistors are illuminated and the signal
values are inferred based on the measured emitted light. Two
broad classes of voltage probing are frontside and backside.
The frontside of the chip is the side of metal layers while the
backside is the side of the substrate. With the growing number
of metal layers on the frontside, backside probing may seem
more promising as it keeps the metal layers intact and preserves
the proper functionality of the circuit [11]. Preparing the chip
for frontside probing requires decapping the chip by removing
epoxy and blocking metal layers to access the internal signals
or transistors while backside probing only requires simple
thinning and polishing from the back [22], [3]. The ability to
probe node values enhances the attacker’s observability.
Having access to the value of internal signals can also help
the SAT solver to make inference about the possible connections
between gates. Even when gate functions are unknown, it is
known due to the nature of circuits that each gate instance must
implement a deterministic Boolean function; in other words,
any gate must always map the same gate input value to the
same gate output value.
As a demonstration of how probing can eliminate some
candidate connections, consider the example of Tab. I that
shows the values of selected nodes when five different primary
input values are applied to a circuit. Assume in this case that
the attacker knows that node X is the output of a 2-input
gate and nodes A, B, and C are other nodes in the circuit.
Without knowing the connections of the circuit, the attacker
knows only that the inputs to the 2-input gate that produces X
are either (A,B), (A,C), or (B,C). For each primary input
that is applied to the circuit, probing the values of node X
and each of the possible gate input connection pairs make up
different cases as shown in Tab. Ib. Looking at these truth
tables, we can see that it is impossible for the gate input
connections to be (B,C), because X takes different values in
the three vectors that induced (B,C) to have the values (1,0).
Input combinations (A,B) and (B,C) both imply a consistent
(deterministic) function for the gate, so neither of these can be
ruled out. Note that our pair notation is not ordered; in other
words, (ni, nj) = (nj , ni).
Using probed values to rule out infeasible input combinations
leads to, for each gate, a set of feasible input pairs. If the set of
nodes in the circuit is denoted as N , for each node nx ∈ N that
is the output of a 2-input gate a set of feasible input pairings
(F (nx)) can be calculated as shown below, where n
j
i is the
value of node ni ∈ N when the jth input vector is applied to
the circuit.
TABLE II: When a fault is applied, a corresponding output
observation is made that is either ocorrect (if it matches the
non-faulted circuit output) or ofaulty (if it differs from the
non-faulted output). The table summarizes the information that
is revealed by each outcome.
condition output information learned
SA-1 ofaulty
fault-free value of target node is 0 AND
fault must propagate to observed outputs
SA-0 ofaulty
fault-free value of target node is 1 AND
fault must propagate to observed outputs
SA-1 ocorrect
fault-free value of target node is 1 OR
fault does not propagate to outputs
SA-0 ocorrect
fault-free value of target node is 0 OR
fault does not propagate to outputs
F (nx):=(ny, nw)∈N2 |
(
(niy, n
i
w)= (n
j
y, n
j
w)
)
⇒
(
nix=n
j
x
)
(1)
V. LEARNING FROM FAULT INJECTION
Our formulation incorporates the use of fault injection in
the reverse engineering process. The use of fault injection is
important when trying to reverse engineer gate-level schematics
because input/output observations and probing can be insuffi-
cient to uniquely recover the implementation. In our setting,
the attacker targets specific nodes as instructed by the SAT
solver, but performs each fault injection on a node without
knowing the function of any gates or their connections.
In laser fault injection, the attacker can use a setup that is
very similar to that used for probing [16]. However, instead
of measuring the reflected light, he chooses wavelength and
energy of the laser pulse so that the photoelectric effect occurs.
When focusing the laser beam at a transistor node, an electric
current is generated. The induced current might charge or
discharge the output of the gate, depending on whether the
targeted transistor is a PMOS in the gate’s pull-up network
or an NMOS in the gate’s pull-down network. The ability to
inject such single bit errors has been experimentally verified
down to 45nm feature size [17]. Given that the duration of
laser faults can exceed the clock period, they can be modeled
as stuck-at faults in the circuit model.
Masking is an important consideration in fault injection.
When the attacker tries to force a 0 or 1 value onto a node
for some applied input vector, the induced value will have
no effect if it matches the fault-free value of the same node.
Similarly, even if the induced value does change the value
of the targeted node, it is possible that the changed value
may not propagate to the outputs. Cases where an induced
fault changes the output are perhaps the most informative in
reverse engineering. In these cases, the attacker learns that the
fault-free value of the node is opposite the induced value, and
learns the specific output value that is caused by the fault. The
information learned from different fault injection outcomes
is listed in Tab. II. We show in the formulation described
in section VI-C that inference from fault injection can be
integrated into a SAT-based reverse engineering framework,
and this leave the deductions shown in Tab. II to be made by
the SAT solver.
VI. EXTENDED SAT FORMULATION
We have previously shown in section III how to model each
gate based on the attacker’s knowledge about the circuit. In
this section, we first show how to enforce gate levelization in
the model to restrict the solver to loop-free circuits, and then
we show how to incorporate the additional information from
voltage probing and fault injection into the SAT problem so
that it can be used by an attacker having these capabilities.
A. Restriction to Acyclic Topologies
The basic SAT formulation given in Sec. III allows for cycles
in the wiring connections that would not occur in combinational
circuits. The possibility of cycles is problematic because cycles
allow circuit nodes to become undefined state variables (that
are not determined by the circuit inputs). This allows the solver
to repeatedly find erroneous discriminating inputs, which in
reality are not useful in the reverse engineering process.
To avoid this problem, we modify the SAT formulation to
disallow cycles while still allowing arbitrary acyclic topologies.
Our solution for disallowing cycles is to enforce that the
SAT solver only find solutions in which the topology can be
levelized (i.e. topologically sorted). We solve for the circuit’s
levelization as part of the same SAT formulation that solves for
the gate functions and connections. To do this, we add auxiliary
variables (to denote levels) and levelization constraints to the
SAT problem. Our proposed levelization-enforcing approach
is not only helpful for our problem and assumptions, but also
can help making any SAT attack feasible when there is an
uncertainty in connections that could otherwise allow a loop
in the circuit. For example, it can be used to break the cyclic
obfuscation approach in [18] by solving for the actual levels
of gates and hence figuring out the dummy connections that
would otherwise make the SAT attack impossible.
In the conventional levelization definition, levels increase
from inputs to outputs. In our formulation, the levels increase
from outputs to inputs, but otherwise the levelization notion is
the same. Any gate connected to a primary output should be
assigned level 1, and the level of every gate must be exceeded
by the levels of the gates providing its inputs. In other words,
the level of any gate should be higher than the level of all its
fanout gates.
Encoding Constraints: For each gate gj in a circuit
with n levels, we define a bit-vector of auxiliary variables
(l0(gj), l1(gj), . . . , ln(gj)) to encode the level of the gate. The
level of the gate is encoded in a thermometer code style, with
a number of 0 values followed by number of 1 values. If bit
li(gj) is 0, then gate gj exceeds level i. If bit li(gj) is 1, then
the level of gate gj is less than or equal to i. Therefore, the
level of the gate can be said to be the left-most bit position
in which the value is 1. For example in Fig. 2, the level of
g2 is 2 because l2(g2) is the left-most bit position with value
of 1. In any legal thermometer coded value, every 0 bit in the
vector other than the first must be preceded by another 0 bit,
and this is enforced by the encoding invariant shown in eq. 2.
The first and last bit of the level encoding vector must be 0
and 1 respectively for all gates.
∀i>0, gj :
level>i︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬li(gj)⇒
level>i−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬li−1(gj), ∀gj : ¬l0(gj) ∧ ln(gj) (2)
Ordering of Levels: For the circuit to be levelized, each
gate gj at level i or greater must get its inputs from gates at
level i+ 1 or greater. Using transition predicate R(a, b) (see
Sec. III) to denote a connection from output of gate a to an
input of gate b, any legal level-ordering between nodes a and
b must obey the ordering constraint in eq. 3. For example in
Fig. 2, l1(g2) = 0 (meaning that gate g2 is level 2 or higher)
and we have R(g0, g2) = 1 and R(g1, g2) = 1, indicating that
both g0 and g1 fan out to g2. Therefore, the ordering constraint
enforces that l2(g0) and l2(g1) must both be 0, meaning that
gates g0 and g1 are at level 3 or higher.
∀i>0, gj , gk :

level≥i︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬li−1(gj)∧R(gk, gj)
⇒
fanin level≥i+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬li(gk) (3)
g1
g0
g2
R(g1,g0)
R(g1,g2)
R(g0,g2)
l0 l1 l2 l3 l4
0 0 1 1 1
level = 4
level = 2
l0 l1 l2 l3 l4
0 0 0 0 1
l0 l1 l2 l3 l4
0 0 0 1 1 level = 3
Fig. 2: Sample levelization encoding in a circuit
B. Adding fault injection results to SAT problem
We now extend SAT attacks to account for the attacker’s
ability to inject faults. To incorporate fault injection results
into the SAT problem, the attacker can add a new multiplexer
to select between faulty or normal values for all nodes (except
primary inputs) in his model, and then allow the SAT solver
to guide his fault injection trials as will be shown. This new
structure is shown with thick lines in Fig. 3. For a node nx in
the circuit, injectFaultx is a primary input to the model that
selects whether or not a fault should be injected on it. Primary
input signal FaultV al determines the value that is forced onto
the selected node. Node nx fe is the fault-enabled version of
the node, which is either the value computed by the circuit for
nx, or the value forced onto the node by fault injection.
Discriminating inputs produced by the solver now provide
the reverse engineer with an input vector to apply to the circuit,
as well as a node to fault, and a faulty value to inject on that
node. The attacker applies these conditions to the oracle circuit,
finds the resulting output vector, and feeds the conditions back
into the SAT solver as constraints. The ability to have additional
discriminating information through fault injection can allow an
attacker to better distinguish between circuit implementations
that are overall functionally equivalent.
C. Adding Voltage Probing to SAT problem
We now extend SAT attacks to also incorporate voltage
probing. Voltage probing has the effect of selectively making
internal nodes of the circuit visible to the attacker, which
in the attacker’s model is equivalent to selectively making
internal nodes appear as part of the observable output vector.
We create an input signal in the model that selectively activates
the observability of a node so that, when the SAT solver finds
a discriminating input, that input now indicates to the attacker
whether any internal signals should be probed when the vector
is applied to the oracle. The corresponding output vector and
probed value are fed back into the SAT attack as the additional
constraints on the circuit configuration variables.
Probing is illustrated in Fig. 3 using a model of a circuit
with a single internal node C. The newly added input signal
ProbeC selects whether the value of node C can be considered
when finding a discriminating input vector. Whenever the solver
decides to assert the input signal ProbeC , then a discriminating
vector is one that can produce different values on the primary
outputs or on the now-observable signal C. Whenever the
solver does not assert ProbeC , then the approach reverts to
the standard SAT attack that discriminates between possible
configurations based on the primary outputs only.
VII. RESULTS
We have evaluated our approach for two small circuits. The
first is ISCAS’85 benchmark circuit c17 comprising 6 gates,
4 internal wires, 5 primary inputs and 2 primary outputs; the
second is an S-Box from the PRESENT block cipher [2]
comprising 20 gates, 16 internal wires, 4 primary inputs and
4 primary outputs. For our oracle, we simulate the circuit
and perform fault simulation using ModelSim. The attack
is performed on a fully-camouflaged netlist where all gates
and connections are unknown and modeled as explained in
Section VI. We perform the SAT attack using a modified
version of a program from existing work [24]. The results for
runtime and number of iterations (i.e. number of discriminating
inputs found) before the algorithm terminates are shown in Tab.
III, and explained in the following subsections. The algorithm
terminates when no more discriminating inputs can be found,
and at that time, the recovered solution is compared to the
original netlist to see whether they are equivalent on a gate-
by-gate basis.
A. Distribution of SAT variables
In all cases, the levelization constraints are found to be
necessary for the SAT attack algorithm to terminate successfully
(See sec. VI-A for details). The majority of the variables
and clauses in the SAT problem are used to implement the
constraints that enforce levelization. For circuit c17, Fig. 4
shows the proportion of SAT variables that are used in each of
the following aspects of the formulation: The function variables
that help with solving gate functions, the connection variables
that are created to solve the gate connections, the levelization
variables that are created to enforce levelization in the circuit,
the fault injection variables that are used to add fault injection
capabilities to the model, and the variables related to circuit’s
primary inputs and outputs and constraints thereof.
B. Effectiveness of fault injection and probing
As can be seen in Tab. III, the problem is not solved within
hours if probing and fault injection are not used. When probing
is enabled, but fault injection is not, the algorithm converges
to a solution in a timely manner. However, the solution is not
unique, and in the case of the S-Box the recovered circuit
does not match the structure of the target circuit that is being
reverse engineered. Therefore, probing alone doesn’t fulfill our
objective of finding solutions that are structurally equivalent
to the original netlist on a gate-by-gate basis.
Using fault injection along with voltage probing in reverse
engineering makes it possible to find a unique solution for
both circuits. In case of the S-box circuit with fault injection
and probing, approximately 800K variables and 5M clauses
were generated to solve the problem. This solution is identical
to the target circuit in all connections and all gate functions.
Note that the formulation that includes both probing and fault
injection requires more iterations (more discriminating inputs).
This occurs because of the large space of fault injection tests
and the need to rule out every possible circuit configuration
that is not exactly the same as the target, instead of merely
ruling out the configurations that are not functionally identical
to the target.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a SAT-based invasive
reverse engineering technique that uses probing and fault
injection to deobfuscate a circuit. Starting with no knowledge
about the gate functions or how they are connected, our
approach provides the reverse engineer with a specific set
of fault injection and probing experiments to perform on the
obfuscated circuit that will allow him to eventually resolve all
of its unknown gate functions and connections. Unlike existing
SAT attacks, we show that our approach is able to recover the
exact gate-by-gate netlist of the obfuscated circuit.
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